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As I was looking at Techmeme today in order to refresh our sponsorship link, I noticed that the absolute rage this weekend is the "leaked" memo by Yahoo SVP Brad Garlinhouse about how the company has no focus, is too fat, and most importantly, is trying to do too many things at once (and is thus spread "thin like peanut butter"). There must be hundreds of bloggers linking to the 2-3 main threads playing out over this public mea culpa, and for the most part there seems to be consensus around this notion that there are far too many redundancies in the projects that the company is pursuing.

I don't buy it. It's particularly interesting to see this piece come out just two weeks after everyone applauded Ev for relaunching Odeo as a sort of modern-day incubator because of his belief that it was just too hard to predict the hits a priori. Why can't this same reasoning be used to justify the co-existence of Yahoo Photos and Flickr, Delicious and MyWeb? After all, if Ev is right, and the home runs are too hard too spot up front, what a company like Yahoo needs to do is adopt a portfolio model where each property becomes an investment buying for the eyeballs and hours of potential users— to say nothing of the fact that it is not clear that there are not distinct non-overlapping audiences for some of the "competing" properties. They may be too slow to kill off the losers, and the company may in fact be over-run by middle management embahs that lack the cojones required to make big strategic bets, but if the Odeo learning is right, the fundamental portfolio plan for big hits seems pretty sound to me.

Except that I think that part of what is killing Yahoo is that they've gotten themselves cross-wise to the grain of the web. That term comes from Paul Graham's essay defining Web 2.0 when he applied it to describe why success seems so friction-free for Google while other similarly-sized companies (Yahoo) seem to struggle in the brave new Web 2.0 world. Because of their roots, because of this huge Damocles sword hanging over their heads every night at 12:00AM (just one billion page views to go before the clock rolls again!), and maybe even because it is staffed by Hollywood types, Yahoo can't escape this "hits-based" approach to building destinations on the web.

And yet, if there is one thing we can say about Web 2.0 is that to truly add value, people building applications, communities, etc. need to think less like bricks and more like mortar. When the web was new, getting big was all that mattered, and even with the recent MySpace-inspired frenzy, misguided M&A folks have felt that building the biggest pile of bricks was the only path to winning. This notion more than anything else is what is guiding Yahoo's current portfolio model— buying companies and hoping that a few of them can turn out to be big bricks with little in the way of direct investment post-merger and alignment within an overall strategic vision.

Meanwhile Google, with its syndicatable AdWords service and bottomless appetite for crawling even the most miniscule of sites, is showing us again and again that mortar really pays the bills (not necessarily though that they are any better at acquiring companies). Someone recently told me that 40% of requests for YouTube streams are requested from a non-YouTube site (thanks to the embeddable YouTube widget)— a statistic which, if true, is the ultimate affirmation of the services-as-mortar model that Google seems so good at pursuing.

Interestingly, a couple of Yahoo's more popular recent acquisitions have been great mortar plays— Flickr and delicious. The unfortunate thing seems to be that as soon as these little mortar players get under the purple umbrella their mandate seems to change to building big bricks in order to justify the eventual "monetization strategy."

I am sure there are many things currently plaguing Yahoo that have nothing to do with this brick-and-mortar metaphor— I mention it only because it seems to be a decent way to think through a more coherent (and timely) strategy for making something out of the sticky mess that Yahoo is currently facing.

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Markoff had the scoop on the next tidalwave of innovation on the Internet with front page puff piece in sunday's New York Times on the coming Web 3.0— a vast interconnected fabric of machines that understand each other and do our bidding so that we can schedule vacations, buy cars, and do all sorts of neat things with preciously little input on our part. Good times.

If you suspend disbelief for a moment on the possibility that you would want to ever have a machine buy me a car or book me a vacation without the level of time that you normally invest in doing those things today, I think the best way to tell that the piece is lightweight— and more importantly that it probably has the predictive power of lottery ticket— is to go into the time machine and look at Apple's Knowledge Navigator concept video from the 1980s and see how much of this Web 3.0 vision is just rehashing a very sexy idea that people trot out (like Sculley did then) when they are lacking a real actionable vision.

To be fair, it probably going to happen someday (along with flying cars and matter replicators) but so far in the future that it seems silly to be writing now about how this is what's coming after Web 2.0. Of all of the discussion that followed the article, my favorite take on it was Ross Mayfield's which simply stated: it's about the people stupid, and not about the super smart computers that reason.

While everyone else was busy working on all sorts of flux capacitor-like algorithms for processing the vast array of data on the web, Google proved that a conceptually simple algorithm for intelligently using key metadata could build enough value to unseat huge incumbents. Even today, the blogosphere gets all abuzz about startups that try to take on ridiculously hard computer science projects and productize them in the short time usually allowed by the venture model (even when it doesn't seem to work) and instead ignore incremental efforts to make what we have better and more usable.

It's easy to understand the power of "the story" around machines that truly reason— after all science fiction has trained us for the last 60 years that this eventuality is going to bring with a whole universe of interesting possibilities— so it's understandable that Markoff would know the Times readers would eat this up. What is not so great is when the air is sucked out of the discussion because of fluffy proclamations about "Web 3.0" and the ensuing raging debate about whether we are there yet or not. It's overload and has three direct casualties that I can see:

  1. There are people out there doing very interesting things around a lot of what could eventually really help the coming of this future that science fiction writers have been writing about, most notably anyone involved in microformats work. These guys are doing great stuff but it's going to be very incremental, and as such, it's important that we neither rush them nor discourage them.

  2. If you pull the bread out of the oven too soon, it simply will not have risen enough and you'll get a gooey mess. Tim O'Reilly's brilliance in coining Web 2.0 wasn't in the what but in the when. For a variety of reasons, he just nailed the timing at exactly the right moment. Peter Rip talks about Noah Spivak's company being "outed" too early which I am sure is not an isolated incident.

  3. While understandable, the shoot-for-the-moon science project approach to big stories can sometimes cause all of us little people who work hard for our coverage to take our eye off the ball (A social photo site that doesn't implement groups for 3 months because there are "cooler" things to do?!?).

We as entrepreneurs, makers, power users, and gadflies need to stay focused on what is achievable and what actually brings value to users in measurable increments of time. From that perspective it might be better if John would stick to covering research labs in universities (which he does mention), or better still, covering something like the transport of matter through information streams.

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Ev, who I find to be as intellectually honest as anyone I've ever met in the Internet sphere, has decided that the venture model is not right for Odeo and bought out his investors to create a more experimental, nimbler company. Or perhaps he saw that the podcast runway wasn't quite long enough for the big old airplane his VCs had saddled him to reach V2 and not crash. Either way, it takes balls to do what he is doing and I bet there is more than one funded entrepreneur out there right now scratching his head and saying, wow wouldn't it be nice to try that?

And in some ways it would. But I am a little struck by the fact that what he's doing with the new company (Obvious) is turning it into something that looks a lot like 37Signals. I can understand why 37signals wanted to do this— as a consulting shop without outside capital, they had little other choice. But for a company with no consulting clients to disengage and enough capital in the bank, setting up a "lab-like" structure with the general mandate "build webapps" seems to be a strange choice.

There is great benefit to come from focus, especially for those projects that require more than 2 engineers and 3 days. And external constraints are a good thing for creativity— even the best artists tell you that the clashes between the limitations of their medium and their intent is where most of the good stuff happens. Without deadlines and ship dates (the website kind not the packaged software kind), or external dependencies to other parts of a company (marketing/biz dev./the BOD), it's hard to see how any constraints can be enforced. The lab thing smells of the R&D labs of places like Microsoft and Yahoo (though supposedly Google has cracked the code on how to do this right) and it makes me wonder whether the outcome might not be similar— lots of smoke and no fire.

In looking for the why? behind this new structure, I found this part of his blog post:

Nearly everyone I know in the Internet business is either at one of the giants, wishing they were at a startup, or at a startup that hopes get bought by a giant. ...and later... The consumer web is increasingly hits-driven and increasingly crowded, which makes it more difficult to predict what's going to work.

to be most telling.

Ev is describing the Hollywood model where a studio backs two dozen movies in the hopes that one will hit it big and cover all of the flops. The way I see it, he's basically saying: no one can tell what the difference between a Star Wars and an Ishtar is but we know we want a hit with the consumers, so we've got to try a lot of stuff. I sort of agree with his statement that it's hard to know ahead of time what the megahits are going to be— but I am bummed to see that in this day and age of cheap innovation on the web, we're all stuck with the hits-driven model.

Why? Because, first of all, getting to 10MM users should not be the only path to success. And secondly, a web service is not like a studio movie in one critical way: if it sucks at launch, the web as a medium allows you to rip it apart and put it back together so that it does work for its natural audience. A movie is a piece of media you finish and ship— a website is a process of learning from your users and the limits of your medium.

I think this unfortunate mindset comes back to business models. We're back in the eyeballs game except that now the world is dominated AdWords which means that it's even less profitable than it used to not to be at some large enough scale where you can afford to own (or be owned by someone who owns) the ad network. And without the opportunity for other types of business models that work at lesser scales, everyone is going to be stuck going for the next MySpace or hoping to fool some big megacorp into thinking that there might be a small chance that they will someday become the next MySpace.

An example of the opportunities this mentality squelches: I liked Odeo a lot— I thought there were a lot of things that they did which were much better than what iTunes did. As a paying member of Audible (a much worse website for finding and acquiring audio), I would have gladly switched over to pay for an Odeo premium subscription if they had just added some more types of licensed content. Now I realize that people don't generally like to think of subscriptions as a viable business model on the web today but one good thing about charging for a service is that revenue grows linearly with the user base which means that the business doesn't have to get to 10 million actives before it can make some nice money. Ditto for e-commerce models, or mass-customized output models.

Good luck to the Obvious guys— but let's hope that as part of the experimentation, the play around with some of the businessmodel constraints that got them there in the first place.

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Tim O'Reilly is right to point out how much of the hacking/Make attitude we can now start to take towards our devices thanks to every embedded CPU's inexorable march towards Internet connectivity. One category that I've been especially interested in for a while now is digital cameras because no matter what proponents of the uber mobile communicator tell me, cellphone cameras are still too closed, too blurry, and too painfully slow to make most of us even remotely happy with their output.

For some time now, the big pocket camera vendors have been experimenting with Bluetooth and 802.11b/g on a few of their models but most of these approaches have either been brain-dead (like the Kodak Easyshare One which only connects to Ofoto) or too cumbersome (like the Nikon Coolpix P1) to be worth the effort and compromise one had to make on the camera side of the equation. Which is why I was so interested while reading Katie's recent review in the Wall Street Journal of Nikon's S7c Coolpix wi-fi 7MP camera, and in particular, seeing her conclude that the whole wi-fi piece was actually quite usable. So I finally decided to go ahead and take the plunge and get a S7c... and have thus far been pleasantly surprised.

I'm not going to go into a review of the camera (see below for my tabblo doing just that) but wanted instead to focus on a couple of things that Nikon has done which are really smart from the perspective of this whole hacking your devices meme in the hope that others (hello Apple? Sony?) take notice.

First off, you should think of the camera as an open access point sniffer with a lens. Instead of forcing you to have a computer running a software client, or to pre-program a set of access points you want to use ahead of time, the S7c's wi-fi mode is set to start scanning for any access point that it can associate with. This is fabulous and exactly how every wi-fi device should work– instead of futzing around with WEP keys or preferred access points, the S7c just claws its way to a TCP connection and starts sending its pictures out into the ether. Another very nice touch that I am sure some Nikon biz dev guy deserves a steak dinner for is a deal with T-Mobile which gives you a free ride on their Starbucks network for 1 year. This costs T-Mobile nothing and adds a tremendous amount of value to the "platform" that Nikon is building here.

The second great thing Nikon has done is perhaps more important still– it has all but invited hackers into the image stream that the camera can emit. Officially, your pictures are uploaded to a site run by Nikon called nikonipcss.com (though its marketing name seems to be "Coolpix Connect") and an email is sent automatically to whoever you want that contains a link back to the Nikon site with an authentication token that automatically shows your guests the pictures you've uploaded through the camera. To say that the Coolpix site is spare is an understatement but what it lacks in flash it more than makes up in usability. First, no passwords required (the token takes care of that), and second (unlike most photo sites operated by output vendors or mobile phone operators) there is no clutter dedicated to selling you other junk or reminding you that you are trapped in some Sony/Verizon silo where the price of entry entails roach-moteling your data.

But the best part of the whole Nikon experience for me was how easy it was to hack the site and wrap an API around getting my photos out. Having spent a good many hours writing screen scrapers to fight the roach-motel model across different types of sites, I sat down this morning to figure out how to marry the S7c's cool new wi-fi features to our own auto-tabblos (basically a tabblo with an email address that can receive pictures and/or text for automatic inclusion) armed with Firebug and the desire to set my data free. Forty-five minutes later I was done and pushing a plug-in into our email processing infrastructure that can take the Nikon Coolpix emails in one side and end up with the actual assets in your tabblo on the other. Now it's just a few hours later and everyone using Tabblo gets S7c import for free– just create an auto-tabblo and send your Coolpix email to the auto-tabblo's address. [ If you are interested in this for yourself, email me– depending on interest level, I may go through the effort of factoring out the Tabblo dependencies to release it as a stand-alone Python module ]

I haven't talked to Nikon formally about this whole effort but given that the Coolpix site erases your pictures after two weeks (and given that I don't think they are in the business of building advanced AJAX multi-format layout engines), I suspect that they will be ok with my efforts to build on the platform they've put out there. After all, I am now excited by new camera and its possibilities and will recommend it to all of the folks who've asked me in the past about getting one of these w-ifi cameras to route around the issues with cellphones and photos.

Notice that Nikon doesn't have to spend the time and energy developing a nice Flickr-like API in order for folks like us to do this– they just have to make a device/platform that provides enough value (which their camera + access point sniffer + T-Mobile subscription certainly does) and then simply not make stupid decisions that would foreclose experiments like this on the part of hackers. Because the truth is that it wouldn't have been too hard for them to make this a much more involved project (for a good example of this, try hacking on Shutterfly or Ofoto).

Doc Searls (who is a friend and advisor to Tabblo) has recently begun talking and blogging about the need to create photography 2.0 out of an ecosystem of players who all add value around the user's data– with new formats, products, services, etc. He often uses Flickr's open data API and our integration as an example of such a model but the part of his speech that I like the best– and which also scares me the most– is when he starts talking about how the big photo 1.0 players like Eastman Kodak don't see it this way because of their need to maintain "silos of control." For me, this Nikon thing is a good example of a big player who gets it– or at least is willing to let others experiment while they sit back and try to sort it all out.

By the way, if you want my thoughts on the S7c as a camera:

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Much has been made of Jeff Bezos's talk this week at some MIT conference on web services, and specifically S3 (the storage service) and E2C (CPU service). Wade Roush from MIT Tech Review interviewed him and everyone who saw the interview felt compelled to announce to the world that all of us little startups need to move all of our backend processing and storage to Amazon's cloud. Even the ever present canary in the coal mine, Nick Carr, seemed relatively positive about it.

This just doesn't pass the smell test for me. I know that other little companies that I respect like SmugMug have raved, especially about S3 the storage service, but I have very real concerns about the viability and scalability of this approach and I certainly feel like any commercial companies that put a key piece of infrastructure under S3 are a bit like the test pilots who fly the monster jets that have previously only "flown" in simulation. [Disclosure: for big compute applications (which I am not familiar with) E2C may actually make sense so the rest of this post is really about S3, and any other infrastructure tier services like SQS).

First, anyone who has worked on a big website that has grown organically over a period of years knows just how rickety and duck-tapey the whole infrastructure can get. This has got to be especially true for Amazon which got started before we learned about how to scale on the web. And it's actually a fine thing for most sites– because just like the pilot who still flies mail routes on a DC-3 with bolts popping out of it, most sysadmins/developers at these big sites learn to put their hand on the fuselage and just know where the bolts might be about to pop.

However, I'm not sure that this institutional knowledge will export well across SLAs and web service APIs. More importantly, at the end of the day Amazon is a retailer that makes its money from selling stuff which necessarily means that all of its best and brightest are probably working on that side of the fence. Even if there is a small and talented group pushing the infrastructure web services initiative, they've still got to deal with 11 years of bolts that have have come loose and been tightened under the pressure of having to keep Amazon's site and sales up.

Second, people seemed to make a big deal out of the fact that Amazon has built infrastructure that is often at less than 10% utilization which must mean that they have plenty of capacity for third parties. But they certainly didn't build a system intending it to stay at 10% utilization– they've instead built all of this infrastructure to handle peak load at certain times of the year (say Christmas). What happens if as a consumer of AWS, your business cycle also peaks during the holidays (as most output-based businesses do including ours). When it's about serving your files or that gif of the Davinci Code, how is the decision made? And even if it's evenly distributed, do you really want your traffic to be mushed in the stream with the 35M people trying to buy last minute Christmas presents going through the app is best tailored to use these services? How many optimizations have the developers at Amazon put in that you just won't know about when the load spikes on that compute grid?

I don't want to sound like one of those off-the-grid guys who wants to produce his own electricity– however, I'm not sure I'd want to buy my electricity from Costco just because they have big generators at the back of their store that sit idle right until the middle of summer.

Finally, what really gets me about the whole proposition is not that it's a bad idea– it certainly makes a lot of sense to have services provided by infrastructure providers up in the cloud– but that it seems misguided in design and then promoted under false assumptions. If I were Amazon and wanting to get hardcore about the web services space, I would look at my assets and start from either my payment processing capabilities or my huge content archive of product and sales data. When Amazon launched its web service API (the one that let you get products and prices) a few years ago, I thought for sure this is where they were going, and so it comes as a surprise to see them now recasting themselves as an infrastructure utility computing player. Even extending into identity management (as Yahoo did this week) would make more sense from a core competency perspective.

And to the folks that argue that most of us building software are writing 5-10% of software that is truly value-add and 90-95% that is just rote, I would absolutely agree. However the right solution for this problem is open source, not managed services. It really doesn't take that much to go out and buy a rack at a tier-1 datacenter, shove some whitebox 1Us into it and install Linux/Apache/MySQL/YourFavoriteAppStack on it. And if you make a half decent set of stack choices, you'll be able to scale in much the same way that AWS will let you. The challenges come when you have to start getting deep into your infrastructure to understand how your particular application's workload puts stress on it, how you can rework pieces of both the app and the infrastructure to meet your scaling/costs needs.

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