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Josh Kopelman (of First Round capital) has a nice summary of the argument around how Web 2.0 allows investors to place cheaper bets including some data on how much cheaper it is to launch a web startup today. This means that failure comes faster which he argues is a good thing both for the investor and for the entrepreneur.

Largely I agree with argument he makes, but— as is the case with most hypotheses when they pass into the land of "conventional wisdom—" it turns out to be a little more complicated than just: open source, commodity boxes, off-shore development equals a $200K lottery ticket to riches. I think that this model works very well if what you are doing is taking a social media bet whose main goal is to amass users and flip to a big portal before getting to either the "mass market," or more importantly, the monetization.

Flickr, Delicious, even MySpace— all of these guys fall right into this model as do the 50-100 companies that have been micro-funded like by Josh and others. But what happens when Yahoo, Google, IAC, etc. stop buying? How much of the critical risk of building a business is really removed by initial geek traction? Josh himself in an earlier blog post has a brilliant write-up of why it is so hard to get Internet consumers to part with money. Shouldn't this be the key risk to remove before getting to this key valuation inflection point?

I am biased because at Tabblo, I decided to take a hybrid approach: raise an A-round that is reminiscent of the 1990s ($5MM from Matrix partners) but operate the business as though we really had only about a fifth of that. There were two main reasons for this:

  1. I knew we were going to have to build a bit of technology and felt that we needed a pretty unencumbered 18 months to do so with a decently-sized engineering team
  2. I wanted enough cash to get through proving the monetization phase with what we considered a "mainstream" consumer.

Neither of these goals lend themselves to a "failing fast" test (if by fast you mean 3-4 months) so it's pretty hard to do things the microfunded way. And as far as the Tabblo approach is concerned, the jury is still out, so stay tuned.

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Some good clean fun

I was nearly in tears during parts of this cartoon on Steve Jobs and Bill Gates:

My favorite part is Bill Gates on the music prevalent in most of today's PC/Mac ads: "What's up with that music?!? It's like baby music..."

I feel pretty lucky to have grown up during the phase of computing when the titans were Bill and Steve, given that they are both such colorful characters and so distinct from each other. 20-30 years earlier it would have been the Watsons from IBM or the wacky cowboys from the minicomputer revolution. Worse yet, if you were coming out of school today, the titans would be the Yahoo guys, the Google guys, or maybe even the guys from Facebook. Bright and driven, but not terribly distinguishable from each other. I can't really see them inspiring a cartoon like this one— can you?

Update: In digging around on the source of the cartoon, I discovered that it is a show called "Current News," by Josh Faure-Brac, which seems to be cartoon shorts of popular culture/politics hosted on Al Gore's Current TV network. It's too bad they don't serve the shorts as a video podcast feed, but some of the other ones are well worth checking out, especially the Oval Office one.

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The software crisis

I recently got a chance to read Scott Rosenberg's "Dreaming in Code," a story about the ups and downs (mostly downs in this case) of the software development process of Chandler at OSAF. The book is a great introduction to challenges of software engineering, especially for outsiders, though it is nowhere near as good as Tracy Kidder's "The Soul of A New Machine" despite the fact that most reviewers seem intent on comparing the two.

One of the central themes that Rosenberg tackles is that of the "software crisis," or simply put, software engineering's inability to scale the production process in the same way that other engineering disciplines have— most notably, hardware engineering but also mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, etc. In all of these other fields "scale" refers both to being able to linearly apply more manpower while achieving linear or super-linear boosts in productivity, as well as producing less error prone and more predictable output.

This question is of course near and dear to any software person who has ever missed a schedule or over-scoped a feature, so naturally I was drawn to the bibliography where I found an incredibly interesting, albeit dated, book by Brad Cox (the creator of Objective-C) called "Superdistribution" on exactly this topic of scaling software engineering. The book was published in 1996 and is now out of print but I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in software engineering as a fledgeling discipline.

The core of Cox's argument is that the notion of "Software ICs" (software integrated components similar to chips in hardware) has not taken off not because of technical reasons (as he learned after developing Objective-C for just this purpose) but because of economic ones. In essence, he argues that there is no economic advantage to the designer/developer of a software component that can easily be re-used (through good interfaces, cross-language bindings, good documentation, etc.) because the licensed-library model does not provide adequate compensation to create a thriving ecosystem, and because other models (such as per-unit royalties) have not been popular in the software industry for various reasons. Hence capable programming teams are left much more motivated to re-invent the wheel in the hopes of building the next MS Office and are less likely to make a good living at some lower layer (for instance, the word-wrap object, the pagination object, etc.) in the same way that their hardware counterparts have been able to.

His solution turns on a clever attribute of software but is nonetheless completely impractical. Software has no control over its being copied, Cox argues, but it has very tight control over its being executed, and as such, it could establish a payment mechanism based on "useright" rather than "copyright," metering its own use and charging accordingly. This seems counter to the grain of personal computing to me, and in fact the only examples I have ever seen of this model have been with really expensive software ($100K+) where the vendor leaves no other alternative. And of course this is to say nothing of the administrative nightmare that a system like this would be. Current DRM systems would look like "Hello World" by comparison.

So I don't like his solution but I do agree with his conclusion. To scale we do need more modularization, and the reasons for not being there are most likely economic and social at this point— and not because we're still looking for the one runtime to rule them all.

Coincidentally, it is interesting to see how in the intervening decade two trends have helped combat the coming software crisis that Cox predicts in his book. The first, the mainstreaming of open source, has created an alternative economic model for encouraging software re-use, though I suspect Cox would argue that this alternative economic model is not robust enough to survive or scale to what he is imaging. Still, you'd be a moron to try to write an RDBMS or a webserver at this point, and this productivity boost comes directly as a result of the open source production process. The second trend, which seems much more in line with what Cox argues for, is that of metered web services. Amazon S3, EC2, and their brethren are great examples of a pay-per-use model at work, and the fact that the bits are not being pushed down to the client seems to be a great way to solve the language/runtime interop problems that he discusses in the book.

Economic arguments aside, there is tons of good stuff in Superdistribution (if you can get past its datedness and its wonky illustrations). For instance, Cox covers how time-sharing systems have left us with a legacy of independent processes with individual memory address spaces and are thus difficult to integrate in a component-based way while the futuristic systems of the 1970s (Smalltalk in particular) tried to eliminate the distinction between the machine's runtime and the processes running in part to solve this very problem. This was sort of mind-bending to me as I've always seen this as one of UNIX's greatest features (at least when compared to DOS/Windows/Mac OS-pre-X). He also makes a wonderful attempt at building a vocabulary for layers in software and often uses rich analogies from other engineering disciplines to make his arguments.

But best of all, it is clear that Cox is an in-the-trenches engineer who has deep knowledge of languages, platforms, and building big systems. Thus the book avoids that "architecture astronaut" feel that you sometimes get from this kind of effort (sorry but the much beloved Go4 book still feels like that to me). If you are interested in this sort of thing, it's well worth reading.

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Jeremy Liew has a very nice piece for anyone interested in online media business models or even for anyone interested in the "build a web property that is popular and figure out how to monetize it later" approach to starting companies. It is a really short summary of the kind of traffic you should expect/need to get to build a big business based on ads depending on the type of content/audience you are hoping to aggregate.

I like the piece for two reasons. First, most consumer Internet entrepreneurs I meet these days do too little thinking about business model, preferring instead to think that either Google or Yahoo will acquire them or that they will just do the "ad" thing. This is the west coast's "build now, monetize later" investment hypothesis taken to the extreme. To that end, the piece does a great job of showing that banking on this approach has the inbuilt assumption that your web property is basically going to be struck by lightning. It happens— but you shouldn't count on it.

I also really dig the post because in looking at the third model for success— vertical content sites that are best positioned through content for certain types of advertisers— I realized what it is that I dislike about the advertising bet in startup business models: as an entrepreneur, it reduces your optionality (is this even a word?).

Having options when the initial plan doesn't work out is a great thing, especially for small companies in quickly developing spaces. But as I looked at the third, and most viable of the ad models, I realized that there is little option if the vertical content you create fails to attract advertisers or a significantly attractive audience. When that happens, you don't have the scale to just pump generic ads (model #1), and you don't have a model that will continue to itself scale without continued investment. You can try a roll-up across verticals but something like this only gives you scale on the sales side of the business and not on the core value propostion.

If you read the comments (and some of the very interesting posts linked therein), you will see people discussing alternative business models that may work better at maximizing optionality in the face of failing to reach a certain scale. My two favorites are product sales (preferably mass customized like Tabblo's because these avoid pricing pressure best) and subscriptions (but very high value like SmugMug's or eHarmony's), but there are others including "freemium" (though you need a little bit of scale to make this one start to work) and marketplace (where you need a very narrow niche or even more scale).

All of these other models seem to offer more levers to tweak when things don't quite go according to plan. Which is almost always— and a good thing to keep in mind when looking at some of the high hurdles that Jeremy lays out.

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Unix, so right for so long

I really loved this post on O'Reilly Radar from Marc Hedlund, especially when he says:

One of my favorite business model suggestions for entrepreneurs is, find an old UNIX command that hasn't yet been implemented on the web, and fix that. talk and finger became ICQ, LISTSERV became Yahoo! Groups, ls became (the original) Yahoo!, find and grep became Google, rn became Bloglines, pine became Gmail, mount is becoming S3, and bash is becoming Yahoo! Pipes.

It makes sense if you think about it: UNIX was after all the first network-native multi-user (social) operating system. All of those users back then in the 1970s were living William Gibson's future: present, just not widely distributed, so they developed patterns for work and play that most of us are still rediscovering today.

That said, I still really don't get Yahoo Pipes. When Yahoo launched this mashup application a few weeks ago, the entire blogosphere lit up like a Christmas tree with raves about how this was bringing the ability to program the web to the rest of the non-programming world. Just like OO and software components were meant to 20 years ago and just like Applescript and Automator were supposed to over the last few years.

I tried two Pipes. The first one (which took me the bulk of the 40 minutes I spent playing around) was meant to test a theory that Jon Udell told me about recently regarding common identity across various web services: Jon said that one way to tell who was who was to look for common usernames like fetching or supergeek57. So I tried to wire a Pipe that would take one of the recent tabblos RSS feeds, strip out the username, and do searches for same-author Flickr photos:

No dice though. Despite having a Fetch RSS component and a Flickr-specific component, I just could not wire the canned components in the right way. In Python this is a 7 line script but in Pipes, it's a whole lot of cool AJAX dragging and no satisfaction.

Then I figured I would do something simpler and take the Huffington Report's heinously monster RSS feed and filter out Chris Kelly (my favorite blogger from there):

This was much easier to do but I've got to admit that there have to be easier ways to get this done than by building a Pipe.

Unix worked where Yahoo Pipes doesn't because people wrote a large ecosystem of small programs and because the real pipe (|) was more loosely typed and flexible than the Yahoo Pipes inputs/outputs. The first problem could be solved with lots of programmers writing Pipes for regular folk but I have a hard time seeing that so long as it is possible for these same folks to whip off quick Perl scripts that do the same. And without the rich ecosystem of Pipes, I'm not sure the inter-connects will ever get flexible enough.

So while I agree with Marc on the overall insight, I think that Pipes is not the web's replacement for bash. I do think that replacement exists though, and its arrived in a really weird first incarnation: MySpace.com.

Sure it is the uber-daddy of social network, but to me to most compelling part of MySpace was the way that it allowed regular folks to copy and paste bits of HTML and Javascript into profile pages in an interactive way that UNIX folks from the 1970s would have been proud of. And by the look of some of these profile pages, it is unlikely these folks stitching random bits of execution together are particularly technical. Just particularly motivated.

So Marc is right— UNIX is getting re-invented on the web, mostly because the problem domain is the same and the social urge is still there. It's just not the geeks anymore which means that the form it takes is not always a clear and obvious mapping of the UNIX of old.

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