My goal with this blog

I write about relevant changes in the way that people use the web and how startups are built to provide services and products for this ever changing wonderful thing we still know as "the web." As a former entrepreneur turned early-stage investor, my greatest hope is for this to be useful to other folks that are like me in the hopes that they can avoid some of the mistakes I've made.

The changing economics of funding web ventures

Josh Kopelman (of First Round capital) has a nice summary of the argument around how Web 2.0 allows investors to place cheaper bets including some data on how much cheaper it is to launch a web startup today. This means that failure comes faster which he argues is a good thing both for the investor and for the entrepreneur.

Largely I agree with argument he makes, but— as is the case with most hypotheses when they pass into the land of "conventional wisdom—" it turns out to be a little more complicated than just: open source, commodity boxes, off-shore development equals a $200K lottery ticket to riches. I think that this model works very well if what you are doing is taking a social media bet whose main goal is to amass users and flip to a big portal before getting to either the "mass market," or more importantly, the monetization.

Flickr, Delicious, even MySpace— all of these guys fall right into this model as do the 50-100 companies that have been micro-funded like by Josh and others. But what happens when Yahoo, Google, IAC, etc. stop buying? How much of the critical risk of building a business is really removed by initial geek traction? Josh himself in an earlier blog post has a brilliant write-up of why it is so hard to get Internet consumers to part with money. Shouldn't this be the key risk to remove before getting to this key valuation inflection point?

I am biased because at Tabblo, I decided to take a hybrid approach: raise an A-round that is reminiscent of the 1990s ($5MM from Matrix partners) but operate the business as though we really had only about a fifth of that. There were two main reasons for this:

  1. I knew we were going to have to build a bit of technology and felt that we needed a pretty unencumbered 18 months to do so with a decently-sized engineering team
  2. I wanted enough cash to get through proving the monetization phase with what we considered a "mainstream" consumer.

Neither of these goals lend themselves to a "failing fast" test (if by fast you mean 3-4 months) so it's pretty hard to do things the microfunded way. And as far as the Tabblo approach is concerned, the jury is still out, so stay tuned.